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Toward Everyday Justice: On Demanding Equal
Educational Opportunity in the New Civil Rights
Era
MICA POLLOCK*
This Article discusses everyday disputes between ordinary Americans over
defining and addressing racial discrimination in education today. These
disputes were encountered during the author's work experience in the
Federal Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights circa 2000.
(Note: the author is no longer an employee of OCR and does not represent
the agency). This Article contends that in what the author calls "the new
civil rights era," the quest for racially equal educational opportunity takes
place in a new social context of resistance to equal opportunity claims. The
new civil rights era argument against equal opportunity demands is that
racially equal opportunity in the abstract is warranted, but that additional
opportunities for people of color in particular instances cannot be provided,
are not warranted, or are not wanted for particular reasons.
The author contends that to meet the challenge of Grutter in the new civil
rights era, advocates for racially equal educational opportunity must
consider carefully how best to convince fellow Americans to consider how
ordinary, everyday moves in K-12 educational settings provide or deny
young people of color equal opportunities to succeed and thrive.
My research analyzes everyday struggles over race and educational
opportunity in contemporary American education. For my first book, I
conducted research on everyday talk and silence about race and racial
inequality in a diverse United States high school and district in the mid-
1990s.1 This Article reports early findings from a second book on the
everyday disputes over race and educational opportunity I encountered
during a work experience in the Federal Department of Education's civil
rights wing circa 2000.2 Having analyzed everyday U.S. "race talk" and
"colormuteness" in my first book, I am interested here in how Americans
* From November 1999 through June 2001, I worked as a civil rights investigator in
the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). I am no longer an
OCR employee, and I do not represent OCR in any writing on the subject. Currently, I
am an assistant professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Education.
1 MICA POLLOCK, COLORMUTE: RACE TALK DILEMMAS IN AN AMERICAN SCHOOL
(2004).
2 See MICA POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: DISPUTING EDUCATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (forthcoming) [hereinafter EVERYDAY
JUSTICE]. A number of passages in this Article appear in the introduction to this book. See
also Mica Pollock, Keeping on Keeping on: OCR and Complaints of Racial
Discrimination 50 Years After Brown, 107 TCHRS. C. REc. 2106 (2005) (special issue on
the anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education) [hereinafter Keeping On Keeping On].
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today, both inside and outside legal spaces, are arguing about racial
inequality and opportunity in education. I have found that the way we argue
about equal opportunity has a great deal to do with how we act or do not act
to provide it.
3
I thus have an ethnographically based response to the legalistic K-12
challenge launched in Grutter v. Bollinger.4 To meet the challenge of
Grutter, we must carefully consider how best to convince fellow Americans
to make the civil rights logic of equal opportunity a daily educational reality.
Grutter's challenge to make affirmative action unnecessary in twenty-five
years5 really is a challenge to get the nation's children of color equally
prepared for college admission: equally prepared both in comparison to
common academic standards and in comparison to the nation's white
children. Grutter essentially launches a challenge for racial equality of K-12
opportunity, and for racial equality of K-12 outcome. Achieving such racial
equality will require that policymakers pursue the big policy moves of
providing resource adequacy, 6 improving teacher recruitment and retention,7
and the like. Yet my own research 8 also leads me to contend that in the
current era, reaching true racial equality in K-12 opportunity and outcome
will also require fostering a stance and practice of what I am calling
"everyday justice" in the life of each teacher or administrator whose moves
affect children of color in United States schools. To meet the challenge of
Grutter, both educators and policymakers will have to ask themselves the
following questions regarding each ordinary move affecting children:
3 My forthcoming book focuses on the disputes over race and educational
opportunity which I negotiated and mediated at OCR, including arguments over defining
discrimination, determining its existence, discussing discrimination, and disallowing
discrimination. See POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2. Through arguing over
discrimination, the complainants coming to the office, the recipient districts and schools
who received their complaints on official OCR stationary, and I and other employees of
OCR snarled ourselves in central disputes of understanding, discussing, and achieving
racially equal opportunity in the current era. The two years of arguments over educational
discrimination that I participated in while at OCR indicated a need for newly sharpened
analytic tools and newly sensitive social tools for analyzing, discussing, and addressing
precisely which adult behaviors in schools and districts produce and allow racially
unequal educational opportunity today.
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
5 Id. at 343.
6 See PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATrLE FOR ADEQUACY IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (2003).
7 See SUSAN MOORE JOHNSON, FINDERS AND KEEPERS: HELPING NEW TEACHERS
SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN OUR SCHOOLS xiii (2004).
8 See POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2; see also Pollock, Keeping on
Keeping on, supra note 2.
[Vol. 67:245
TOWARD EVERYDAY JUSTICE
* Am I offering equal access to the opportunities and benefits of
education, rather than denying it?
; Am I moving this student closer to opportunity rather than farther
away from it?9
Because children of color are still more typically denied opportunities to
learn in the United States than are white children, 10 the stance and practice of
everyday justice in education particularly will require monitoring and
revising ordinary acts affecting children of color so that acts always provide
educational opportunity rather than deny it. This requires that educators put
on a personal "race lens" to avoid and remedy racially patterned opportunity
denials and to ensure that opportunities are racially equal in the classroom,
school, and district spaces they control. While policymakers must focus on
creating the basic structures for providing equal opportunity-indeed, my
forthcoming book has much to say about how the U.S. Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) itself can pursue equal opportunity
more actively' '-educators (including teachers and administrators) must also
attend to whether their ordinary acts are enabling students of color to truly
enjoy equal access to educational opportunity (equal in comparison to
common standards, equal in comparison to the opportunities enjoyed by
white children, and even equal in comparison to the opportunities educators
would consider humane for their own children). Whenever they are not, each
educator must make ordinary equalizing efforts to ensure equal opportunity
provision to members of all groups-affirmative actions.
This is a tall order and probably, for most readers, a utopian suggestion.
Yet it is essentially what much of the education profession has been hoping
for from its new teachers and administrators, just stated more explicitly. The
United States education profession hopes (at its best) that educators not only
9 One commentator relatedly argues that lawyers and policymakers in education
should ask similar questions about policies, pursuing a practice of "preventive law" that
could prevent legal battles in education. See Merle Steven McClung, Preventative Law
and Public Education: A Proposal, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 37 (1981). McClung suggests
that policymakers and their legal counsel designing new education policies ask about
potential "injury" to any person or persons, and more specifically about potential
aggregated "injury" to groups. Id. at 39. "[W]ill the policy cause disproportionate effects
among any racial, linguistic, ethnic or other protected minority group?... [Riacially
disproportionate effects provide the classic trigger for judicial analysis. Such
disproportionate effects by themselves usually do not constitute illegal action, but raise
the legal issues that need to be evaluated .. " Id. Of course, as McClung notes,
"preventive law assumes a good faith intent, sometimes absent, to design and implement
policy consistent with legal requirements." Id. at 41.
10 See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF
APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 11 (2005) (commenting on the destructive
consequences of "our acceptance of a dual education system").
11 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
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will be excellent at their craft, but that they will treat students equitably while
educating.'2 Indeed, such behavior is what American school systems today
typically request rhetorically from their educators in their mission statements
about achieving "excellence" for "all." 13 Yet making a stance and practice of
everyday justice a reality rather than just rhetoric requires in part convincing
American teachers and administrators that ordinary equalizing moves are
needed from them as well as from policymakers. Thus, I want to focus here
on some tactics suggested by my research for convincing teachers and
administrators (at both the school and district levels) that their own everyday
equalizing acts will be necessary to help produce K-12 racial equality of
opportunity and outcome.
I define successful argument as argument that: (1) eventually serves to
convince educators to move children of color closer to opportunity rather
than farther away from it, (2) has educators acting in ways that make children
and parents of color feel better rather than worse about how schools serve
their needs, and (3) makes educators generally more committed to assisting
children of color as a common good. As I found working at OCR, 14 arguing
with educators by using the argumentative tools of law both enables such
successful argument and botches the task.
The question of why Americans generally, especially white Americans
(the majority of today's teaching and administrator force), would even care
about the opportunities of children other than their own children-literally
their own children, or the children of their racialized group-is a
fundamental contemporary issue. While such caring for "other people's
children"'15 is natural, so is self-interest; Nusseibeh suggests that only if
people see that a move for others is in their and their children's self-interest
will they work toward it. 16 Long ago, Bell recognized the same phenomenon
regarding white Americans in his work on interest convergence; he argued
that white Americans would only pursue policies assisting black Americans
if those policies served white people as well. 17 Accordingly, many in
12 See LINDA DARLING HAMMOND, THE RIGHT TO LEARN: A BLUEPRINT FOR
CREATING SCHOOLS THAT WORK 7-36 (1997).
13 On pervasive contemporary talk of education for "all" students, see
POLLOCK, supra note 1.
14 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
15 See LISA DELPIT, OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN: CULTURAL CONFLICTS IN THE
CLASSROOM (1995).
16 Sari Nusseibeh, Rita E. Hauser Fellow, Philosophy, Al-Quds University, Public
Lecture at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study: What is the Palestinian State
Worth? (Mar. 23, 2005).
17 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence
Dilemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 20, 22 (Kimberld Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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education are trying to make the argument to white people that racially
diverse schools benefit white children as well as children of color, such that
white parents will want to commit to desegregated public schools.' 8 Some
writers, analogously, are now trying to convince white American parents
and/or homebuyers that diversity in neighborhoods is in their interests.' 9 In
this Article, I am concerned not so much with how to convince other
Americans generally (or educators in particular) to want equal opportunity in
the first place, but rather how to convince them (and educators in particular)
to actually provide it through their everyday actions once they profess an
ideological commitment to it. This is especially important because we are at
a moment in American history in which Americans across racial lines profess
a belief in the necessity of racially equal opportunity, but in which many
people make ordinary moves that counter this ideology.20 For reasons I will
explain shortly, I call this moment the "new civil rights era."'
Researchers studying contemporary American life have found that white
Americans-who seem to believe wholeheartedly (at least as stated in
surveys) in racially equal opportunity as an American right-still exhibit
particular resistance to actual opportunity equalization in specific instances.
Capturing the gist of much of this research, Hochschild writes pointedly of
"whites' simultaneous endorsement of the norm of equality and rejection of
steps that could promote it."' 22 A core of well-broadcast public intellectuals
and politicians of color, too, resist specific forms of equal opportunity
provision for people of color, even while arguing more rhetorically that equal
opportunity is each American's due.23 More oppose the provision of
equalizing opportunities at the end of the K-12 pipeline (for example,
affirmative action in college admissions) than the provision of equal
18 See, e.g., john powell, An "Integrated Theory" of Integrated Education 7-8 (Aug.
2002) (unpublished manuscript, given at Center for Civil Rights, University of North
Carolina) (on file with author).
19 See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 185-201 (2004).
2 0 See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACIsM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2003).
21 See POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
22 Jennifer Hochschild, Ambivalence About Equality in the United States or, How
Did Tocqueville Get it Wrong and Why Should We Care? (June 1, 2004) (unpublished
paper, prepared for conference on "Interrupting Oppression and Sustaining Justice" at
Teachers College) (on file with author), available at
http://www.tc.columbia.edu/icccr/IOSJ%2OPapers/HochschildIOSJPaper.pdf.
2 3 See generally JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN
BLACK AMERICA 82-136 (2000); Glenn Loury, Performing Without a Net, in THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 49, 49--64 (George E. Curry ed., 1996); Linda Chavez,
Promoting Racial Harmony, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 314, 314-25 (George
E. Curry ed., 1996).
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opportunities along the pipeline's course. 24 But all endorse the idea of
racially equal opportunity, while typically denouncing particular ways of
making opportunity equal using a "race lens." This dynamic of endorsing the
idea of equal opportunity but resisting the provision of opportunities in
specific instances is central to the arguments explored in my forthcoming
book on the disputes over race and opportunity I encountered while working
at OCR.25
OCR is an environment full of arguments over race and opportunity;
indeed, it is a place that exists to argue about race and opportunity and to
resolve ordinary Americans' arguments about it. With twelve regional offices
across the United States and headquarters in Washington, D.C., OCR
investigates complaints of educational unfairness filed by anyone who can
find an application form and frame a complaint about local school or district
practices so that it falls acceptably within the jurisdiction of the federal civil
rights laws that OCR enforces. Agency employees are guided by thick books
of federal regulations spelling out working definitions of educational
discrimination and internal procedures for implementing the nation's civil
rights laws in schools and districts. These employees take on Americans'
allegations of educational unfairness at multiple scales. Complaints range
from large-scale "class complaints" asserting that entire categories of
children in a school district-students of color, English language learners,
girls, or the disabled-are receiving unequal treatment via ordinary practices
and policies,26 to complaints involving individual children's needs.27 OCR
also occasionally (though rarely, now) undertakes uninvited compliance
reviews of entire districts and universities; it gives policy guidance to
educational institutions informing them of the agency's current interpretation
of civil rights laws in education.
Arguments over race and opportunity in education take place both within
OCR, and between OCR staff and the people they encounter in schools and
districts. 28 Within OCR, all such arguments take place within and across
24 For an argument in favor of equalizing opportunity before college application and
against affirmative action in college admissions, see Loury, supra note 23, at 53-56.
2 5 See POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
26 For example, advocates for such categories of children can complain that students
are being disproportionately denied access to Advanced Placement (AP) classes, assigned
to untrained teachers, or expelled without sufficient cause.
27 For example, (i) a parent of a Latino student may allege the student was
disciplined unfairly for a disputed infraction, (ii) a parent of a deaf student may complain
the student was denied a promised interpreter, or (iii) the parent of a girl may complain
the student was unequally barred from a sports team.
28 The latter type of argument often simply amplifies preexisting arguments over




racial lines. All the people filing the Title VI complaints I saw at OCR were
people of color. All the administrators and educators I met who argued
against specific equal opportunity claims at the school and district level were
white.
The racial discrimination disputes between ordinary American
complainants, recipients, and federal employees that I navigated (and, at
times, instigated) at OCR were sometimes over analyzing, discussing, and
achieving Brown's basic rights to equal educational resources and facilities. 29
Yet more often than not, the racial discrimination disputes I saw at OCR
were actually over less obvious, more ordinary rights to normal, everyday
equal treatment for young people from protected groups in classrooms,
schools, and districts. These disputes included both obliquely academic
arguments over how children should be treated interpersonally in schools 30
and directly academic arguments over how children should be offered
opportunities to learn.31 There were always disputes over how and whether
students' race group membership mattered to the treatment in question. The
disputes always displayed the social tension and resistance sparked by the
very suggestion of racial discrimination in the United States circa 2000.
Navigating these disputes successfully-in ways that convinced
(predominantly white) educators to provide additional opportunities to
students of color or to remedy harm experienced by such students-required
both sharp analytic tools and sensitive social tools, some of which were at
my disposal then and many of which I have discovered only in retrospect.
In an era that lacks the explicitly discriminatory laws of the previous
century, racial inequality is more than ever built by ordinary people at all
levels of the system---us. Yet not all of us, particularly educators, who
currently struggle within seemingly overwhelming educational systems, are
convinced of our everyday roles in producing racially unequal orders---or of
the everyday possibilities for helping to make opportunity equal in grades K-
12. Much of my own work is an attempt to demonstrate to educators just how
their ordinary, everyday moves in educational settings can help provide or
deny young people of color opportunities to succeed and thrive.3 I am not
unaware of "big" "systemic" inequities;33 rather, I am interested in how
29 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
30 An example of an interpersonal treatment argument may involve discipline or
peer harassment.
31 An example of an argument over how learning opportunities should be offered
may involve placement in AP classes or special education.
3 2 EVERYDAY ANTIRACISM: CONCRETE WAYS TO SUCCESSFULLY NAVIGATE THE
RELEVANCE OF RACE IN SCHOOL (Mica Pollock ed.) (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter
EVERYDAY ANTIRACISM].
33 For systemic analyses of such structural inequities, see JEAN ANYON, GHETTO
SCHOOLING: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1997); and see
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ordinary people connected to schools and districts (both educators and
policymakers) might also provide equal opportunity today in their own
everyday ways. Today, it takes not just revisions of high-level funding and
resource distribution or retention of end-of-the-pipeline affirmative action
policies to create racial equality of opportunity in education. It also takes
ordinary people making everyday moves to ensure that educational life in
classrooms and hallways and reading groups and science labs is enabling to
students (and particularly students of color) rather than harmful to them.
Many analysts are calling the current moment-the moment of Grutter
34
and its fraternal twin, Gratz35-a "post civil rights era.",36 The framing
describes our temporal moment, as the marches and victories of the civil
rights movement are now a distant memory to many. The phrase is also
meant to describe the nation's current set of ideological stances regarding
race and equality. According to scholarship attempting to characterize this
era ideologically, we are a nation burned by the experience of integration,
burned by experiments toward equal opportunity, and burned by the never-
materializing reality of true racial equality and reconciliation. Among
Americans of color in post-civil rights America, scholars say, pessimism
about equality reigns, as does distrust of white Americans. According to one
scholar, regarding young African-Americans, for example, "a fourth of the
post-civil rights generation feel that blacks will never achieve racial equality,
compared with only a fifth of the civil rights generation., 37 Among post-civil
rights white Americans, in turn, anger reigns: today's white people, scholars
argue, are resentful and anxious about opportunities they feel have been or
will be stolen by undeserving people of color, via policies like affirmative
generally PEDRO NOGUERA, CITY SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: RECLAIMING THE
PROMISE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (2003); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS:
USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE
ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2004).
34 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
35 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
36 See, e.g., Theresa A. Perry, Achieving in Post-Civil Rights America: The Outline
of a Theory, in YOUNG, GIFTED, AND BLACK: PROMOTING HIGH ACHIEVEMENT AMONG
AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS 87 (Theresa Perry, Claude Steele & Asa G. Hilliard HI
eds., 2003); BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 20, at 4; CASHIN, supra note 19; CIVIL RIGHTS
AND RACE RELATIONS IN THE POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA (Samuel L. Myers Jr. ed., 1997)
[hereinafter POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA].
3 7 ANDREA Y. SIMPSON, THE TIE THAT BINDS: IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS GENERATION 20 (1998). Simpson writes that "[t]he post-civil
rights generation, the 'integration generation,' may not have had the same experiences,
but they have come face-to-face with a different kind of racism, one that is more subtle
but just as powerful," id. at 22, caused by the failure of white-controlled and dominated
institutions to fully welcome and include students of color. See id. at 24.
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action and (often imagined) strategies like "quotas. 38 Scholars also contend
that today's white people continue to feel innately superior to people of color
and, accordingly, still treat people of color poorly in both everyday
interactions and policy making. White people do so, scholars contend, even
while their harmful actions are often more "subtle" than in previous eras and
even while whites continue to believe that people of color now receive
opportunities equal to or even preferable to their own.4°
While many argue that ordinary Americans harm, resent, and fear one
another across racial lines in the current era, legal scholars note further that
the current era demonstrates a policy-level departure from racial equality
efforts.4 ' Such commentators note that beginning even in the 1960s and
1970s, as the civil rights movement came into its own, the nation saw "the
breakdown of the national consensus for the use of law as an instrument for
racial redistribution. '42 In the 1980s, key reforms and programs from the
civil rights era were actively dismantled, while in the 1990s, critics attacked
the "very principle of racial antidiscrimination" as itself racist. 43 Such legal
scholars also characterize the 1990s as marking a "rejection of the always
fragile civil rights consensus and the renunciation of by federal, state and city
authorities (indeed, of the American people themselves) that government not
only can but must play an active role in identifying and eradicating racial
injustice." 44
I accept these colleagues' findings, but I remain more optimistic than
many about the possibilities for convincing educators today (specifically,
white educators) to utilize some concrete strategies for achieving racial
equality of opportunity.45 My conviction is that because the ideology of equal
opportunity reigns generally in the nation even under hostilities about
38 See POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA, supra note 36.
39 Joe R. Feagin, Fighting White Racism: The Future of Equal Rights in the United
States, in id.
40 On "subtle" (to perpetrators) "microaggressions" today, see Daniel Sol6rzano et
al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate: The
Experiences of African American College Students, 69 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 60, 60 (2000).
For survey and interview studies suggesting increasing white hostility to race-based
equality efforts, see BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 20; RACIALIZED POLITICS: THE DEBATE
ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICA (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter RACIALIZED
POLITICS]. For a sampling of such essays analyzing current racial dynamics in what the
editor calls the "post Reagan-Bush era," see POST REAGAN-BUSH ERA, supra note 36.
41 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 17.
42 Id. at xvii.
43 Id. at xxxii.
44Id.
45 See POLLOCK, supra note 1; Pollock, Keeping on Keeping on, supra note 2;
POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2; EVERYDAY ANTIRACISM, supra note 32.
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perceived opportunities denied, this ideology can still be capitalized upon in
education in some crucial ways by convincing educators (like other actors
whose acts affect children) of the need for specific forms of opportunity
equalization that they themselves can accomplish. Rather than lament a "post
civil rights era," then, I wonder about the possibilities of capitalizing upon its
still-pervasive equal opportunity logic in education; for two reasons I instead
call the current moment the "new civil rights era."
First, I do so because the civil rights project of demanding equal
opportunity for groups long disadvantaged in American society has not yet
succeeded in actually providing students of color with truly equal K-12
opportunity via our schools, either between segregated schools or within
desegregated ones.46 Thus, speaking of a "post civil rights era" falsely
suggests that the equal opportunity battle is over, having been either won or
lost. As Lakoff argues more generally of rhetoric, even using such language
47
accepts its premises. I thus argue that contemporary America is still in a
civil rights era precisely because the quest for racially equal opportunity-
48particularly in education-rumbles on in the United States.
Second, I believe it is a new civil rights era because the quest for equal
opportunity takes place in a new social context of resistance to equal
opportunity claims. What could be called the old civil rights era, that of the
1950s and 1960s (which historians argue was rooted in much earlier
struggles, both domestically and globally),49 involved some Americans
fighting for equal opportunity from other (white) Americans who argued
bluntly that equal opportunity was simply not deserved. While the old civil
rights era response to equal opportunity demands was simply "no," I find that
the new civil rights era response falls into the structure of "yes, but." The
new civil rights era argument against equal opportunity demands is that
racially equal opportunity in the abstract is warranted, but additional
opportunities for people of color in particular instances cannot be provided,
are not warranted, or are not wanted for particular reasons.
This is the peculiar era into which the challenge of Grutter has been
launched, and advocates for racially equal K-12 opportunity in education
must navigate this new era with analytic and social awareness. I believe that
4 6 See generally KOZOL, supra note 10.
4 7 GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOw YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE 33 (2004).
4 8 See also ROBERT MOSES, RADICAL EQUATIONS: CIVIL RIGHTS FROM MISSISSIPPI
TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT (2001).
49 Barbara Savage, civil rights historian, notes that this argument is increasingly
pervasive among American historians. Conversation with Barbara Savage, Professor,
University of Pennsylvania, at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study (2005). Her




we must now seek to understand how our very arguments over race and
fairness in the current era do and do not convince other Americans (parents,
policymakers, educators, and politicians alike) to assist children of color in
enjoying truly equal opportunities and in learning and thriving in education.
This is why I am analyzing the ways in which the specific arguments for
equal opportunity that were cycling through OCR circa 2000 seemingly
succeeded and failed in actually getting others (both within the government
and in local schools and districts) to sign on to local versions of the racial
equal opportunity project. 50
Historians demonstrate that in response to the old civil rights era's blunt
rejections, Americans of color, white allies, and later, those who argued that
they were denied opportunities along other axes-women, children of
immigrants, and the handicapped-worked through the channels of law and
civil disobedience to keep demanding and obtaining more equal opportunities
from fellow white Americans who hoarded opportunity with a sense of moral
and political righteousness. This civil rights struggle was waged through a
strategy that was part moral confrontation (via spectacular nonviolent
resistance and memorable speeches), part forceful confrontation (via riots),
part legalistic quest (via court cases and legislative proposals), and part
everyday, ordinary confrontation with fellow Americans in stores and school
courtyards and streets.51
Through everyday local confrontations with those holding the keys to
local opportunity systems 52 and through national legal and legislative
victories, civil rights workers and their "everyday activist" counterparts
53
(who struggled on streets and at schoolhouse doors) succeeded in embedding
the logic of equal opportunity in American life. These civil rights workers
and activists embedded the logic of the civil rights movement into laws and
into bureaucracies like my eventual workplace, the Department of
5 0 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
51 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); MELBA BEALS,
WARRIORS DON'T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF THE BATrILE TO INTEGRATE LITTLE
ROCK'S CENTRAL HIGH (1995); MOSES, supra note 48; CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATiON (2004). Valencia argues that Americans of Mexican descent, for example,
have long pushed for equal educational opportunities through five channels: the work of
individual activists, the work of advocacy organizations, political demonstrations,
legislation, and litigation. Richard R. Valencia, The Mexican American Struggle for
Equal Educational Opportunity in Mendez v. Westminster: Helping to Pave the Way for
Brown v. Board of Education, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 389 (2005).
52 MOSES, supra note 48; BEALS, supra note 51.
53 On "everyday activism," see Jane Mansbridge & Katherine Flaster, The Cultural
Politics of Everyday Discourse: The Case of "Male Chauvinist" (unpublished manuscript,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (on file with author).
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Education's Office for Civil Rights, which was charged from 1967 on to
enforce the concept of equal opportunity in education via the enforcement of
civil rights laws.54 Such individuals even infused the everyday rhetoric of the
United States with the logic and language of the "dream" of equal
opportunity.55 Today, then, the logic and language of racially equal
opportunity reigns in the United States, but full racially equal opportunity
itself does not yet. Even OCR itself, as others have chronicled historically
and I chronicle in the current moment, 56 has made many moves that prevent
students of color from receiving equal, adequate, and even necessary
opportunities to learn and thrive in schools. This prevention has occurred
both through the heated resistance of various presidential administrations to
directly assist students of color (a resistance particularly noted, for example,
under Nixon, again under Reagan, and again under George W. Bush)57 and
54 OCR's website states its government mandated purpose is to "ensure equal access
to education and to promote educational excellence throughout the nation through
vigorous enforcement of civil rights." United States Department of Education, Office of
Civil Rights, Home Page, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html?src=oc
(last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
55 See RACIALIZED POLITICS, supra note 40; BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 20, at 30-
52; JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2003); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural
Interpretation, 62 AMER. SOCIOL. REV. 465,470 (1997).
Taylor argues that how Americans think about inequality was fundamentally and
permanently altered by the civil rights movement:
[T]he movement for black civil rights has played an important role in spawning
similar legal and political movements that have asserted the rights of women,
Hispanic Americans, the disabled, the elderly, and other minority groups. Most of us
have become more aware of the unjust limitations that government and society have
imposed on minority citizens, women, the disabled and others and how our own
prejudices and stereotypes have contributed to these barriers. Once aroused, this
consciousness of injustice does not fade easily, even under the prod of regressive
leadership. Thus, the progress that has been made is not likely to evaporate.
William Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L. J.
1700, 1734 (1986).
56 Pollock, Keeping on Keeping on, supra note 2; POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE,
supra note 2.
57 For a discussion of OCR's history in these eras, see MICHAEL A. REBELL &
ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION: FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN
THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM 62--64 (1985); and see generally Gary Orfield, The
Civil Rights Act and American Education, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 89
(Bernard Grofman ed., 2000); LEON PANETrA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE
NIXON TEAM AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT (1971); see also Kenyon D. Bunch &
Grant B. Mindle, Judicial Activism and the Administration of Civil Rights Policy, 1993
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 76,78-90 (1993); HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK,
II, COERCION TO COMPLIANCE: OR How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE
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through OCR employees' own ordinary arguments over civil rights with
ordinary Americans that fail in the task of convincing educators and
administrators to do the everyday work they can do of providing equal
opportunity and remedying harm. Arguing successfully for racially equal
opportunity today is a particularly complex social task, for we have arrived at
a moment in which most Americans seem to agree in principle (or at least
say they do) that children's educational opportunity should be racially equal,
but in which we do not agree on whether we can, will, or want to do the
equalizing-or even, in some cases, on whether opportunities are currently
unacceptably unequal at all.
Hence, the "new civil rights era" is thus about some Americans (more
often, though not exclusively, people of color) fighting to receive equal
opportunity from other Americans (more often, though not exclusively, white
people) who agree in principle that equal opportunity is now deserved, but
who argue in a myriad of ways that offering specific forms of racially equal
opportunity or reparations for harm is impossible, unwarranted, or
unjustified--or even in some cases, that opportunity is already equal.58 Thus,
the challenge of demanding equal K-12 educational opportunity for students
of color in the new civil rights era is a challenge of getting Americans who
share an equal opportunity logic to collaborate both within and across racial
lines in a practice of equal opportunity provision, and even to agree on
definitions of what unequal opportunity actually looks like.
I want to spend the rest of this Article suggesting several initial findings
from my research regarding the process of demanding equal opportunity for
students of color in the new civil rights era. I want to limit my discussion to
the question of interacting with educators, but my suggestions can be taken
as analyses of broader U.S. dynamics of arguing over race and equal
opportunity. As my analysis of my experience at OCR has demonstrated
most broadly,59 the new civil rights era is characterized by three phenomena
that must be navigated by anyone trying to argue with any other American
for equalizing K-12 educational opportunity racially.
First, racially unequal opportunity is now produced through an
aggregation of ordinary practices and policies, in the typical absence of
explicitly, unabashedly discriminatory laws. Payne calls this a "fragmented"
system, in which it is harder to find specific perpetrators to blame because
inequality is produced through the interaction of countless individuals, many
ACTUALLY REALIZED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, THIS BEING THE SAGA OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS: LESSONS ON
GETTING THINGS DONE (1976); Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The
Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act's Race-Conscious Accountability,
47 How. L.J. 243 (2004).
58 BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 20; Hochschild, supra note 22.
5 9 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
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of whom do not even realize that they play a role in inequality production. 60
In the arena of race (as with gender), the new civil rights era is an era in
which opportunity denials are routine, normalized, and embedded in
everyday experience, rather than (as in the old civil rights era) loudly or
proudly announced as by design. In our desegregated, still segregated, and
resegregated schools, opportunities to learn are denied to children of color
through ordinary practices and policies that harm them as race group
members, but that often do so unintentionally and are often not clearly
marked as actions "because of race." Those Americans claiming that
opportunities are racially unequal are thus in the position of needing to prove
such unequal opportunity, and they will always be countered by other
Americans arguing that they cannot see racially organized harm in ordinary
circumstances. Proving racial inequality today requires coming equipped
with precise evidence as to how harm patterns out in racial ways or harms
children as race group members.
Second, given that the new civil rights era is characterized by everyday
acts that are often racially harmful without explicitly stated intention and at
times indirectly racially harmful (such as when a decision to end housing
assistance disproportionately harms a school's black children), a deeply
controversial (and deeply legalistic) American question rears its head
routinely in American educational life: when and how children are harmed or
disadvantaged because of race. Particularly in interracial educational settings
(that is, schools with white teachers and students of color, or with a racially
diverse student body), this question takes shape as a question of when and
how race matters to conflictual social relationships between educators and
students/parents in schools.6' In a policy context, this question often takes
shape as a debate over whether and how students are disadvantaged "because
of poverty" rather than "because of race," despite the fact that orders of race
and poverty have always been deeply intertwined in the United States.62 In
both policy contexts and in the everyday world of schools and districts,
therefore, people claiming that race plays a role in the harmful treatment of
students of color during the new civil rights era inevitably engage in routine
heated debates over if and when everyday harms and disadvantages to
6 0 CHARLES PAYNE, GETTING WHAT WE ASK FOR: THE AMBIGUITY OF SUCCESS
AND FAILURE IN URBAN EDUCATION (1984); see generally Philomena Essed,
Everyday Racism: A New Approach to the Study of Racism, in RACE CRITICAL
THEORIES: TExT AND CONTEXT 176 (Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg eds.,
2002).
61 See POLLOCK, supra note 1.
62 See generally Manning Marable, Staying on the Path to Racial Equality, in THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 3 (George E. Curry ed., 1996); TOMAS ALMAGUER,
RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA
(1994); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 33.
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students have taken shape "because of race." Those claiming that harm is
racially organized must thus carefully consider which evidence of harm is
most convincing to skeptics with power over children's futures.
Third, given that harm is ordinary and aggregated and the skeptical
observer will always question the racial nature of harm in any particular
instance, this era is characterized by widespread resistance to claims of
"discrimination," and more generally to any specialized efforts to equalize
opportunity or remedy past harm for students of color. Indeed, since any
claim that race group members experience unequal treatment as race group
members will be resisted in this era, so too will most calls for equalizing
opportunity for members of racial groups as such. Any affirmative or
enabling actions for race group members are sure to be resisted in some form
(particularly by people of other "groups"), either through arguments that such
enabling actions are unwarranted or that such enabling actions are
impossible. Those claiming the need for equal K-12 opportunity for students
of color thus need to be prepared to navigate this inevitable resistance, using
tools of convincing, collaboration, and when useful, angry confrontation. (I
say "when useful" because while angry demands often succeed in acquiring
resources from reluctant policymakers, such results are not as common
among educators, who have control over the provision of opportunities
within ordinary schools and classrooms. These educators are the individuals
who will actually help provide K-12 students with the full set of daily
opportunities to learn and thrive, and I am finding that ordinary educators
often respond better to convincing than to angry confrontation.) 63 Wielding
legal tools like OCR's to accuse educators of "discrimination" is at times
essential-particularly for forcing high-level decision makers to provide
what one OCR colleague called the basic skeleton of educational
opportunity. However, mandating equal opportunity on the ground by solely
using an adversarial legalistic orientation can be too blunt a social strategy
for achieving the everyday equal treatment, assistance, and caring that is
necessary to create the daily student and parent experience of equality in the
nation's classrooms, hallways, and administrative offices.
I want to argue, then, four strategies for making successful demands for
racially equal opportunity in the new civil rights era. I will ground my
analysis in the problem of convincing white educators in particular to provide
everyday justice to the K-12 students of color they serve, though I am also
concerned with convincing the various local, state, and federal actors with
power over children to assist those children. 64 First, in this era, I contend,
arguments do best when they provide precise evidence of academic
opportunities denied children of color (and social harm experienced by
6 3 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
64 See generally POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
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children of color), rather than simply denouncing treatment, outcomes, or
institutions as racially unequal. Second, I contend that in this era, arguments
do best when they avoid insinuations about adults' racist intentions to harm
children because of race. Instead, arguments must provide evidence as to
how children are harmed as race group members. Third, I suggest that in
making complaints of racial injustice, advocates do best when they compare
the experience of children of color not only to the opportunities of white
children but also to opportunities deemed academically adequate and even
humane. Fourth and finally, I contend that advocates need to enable and
inspire a "rights discourse" among educators. As activists throughout the
country are noticing, framing racially equal opportunities to learn in school
as a civil right and even as a human right may be an effective tactic for
promoting a stance of everyday justice in the new civil rights era.
I. STRATEGY ONE: PROVIDE PRECISE EVIDENCE OF HARM TO CHILDREN
OF COLOR, RATHER THAN JUST DENOUNCING OUTCOMES
Advocates for equal opportunity often say that things are racially unfair
in contemporary education systems without adequately showing how this
claim is true. In an era in which many Americans are resistant to claims of
unequal opportunity, showing unequal opportunity in action will be far more
effective than simply summarizing its existence. It is essential today to
provide educators with an analysis of what concrete and ordinary inequality
of opportunity in education actually looks like. For example, rather than
simply complaining that there are no Latino students in Advanced Placement
(AP) physics, advocates for racially equal K-12 opportunity need to zoom in
to analyze how no Latino students ended up being in AP physics. While this
analysis might well implicate structural orders of unequal opportunity that
must also be tackled by other players,65 advocates hoping to make headway
in a school and district context need particularly to demonstrate how the
ordinary moves that ordinary school and district adults make toward ordinary
children are also the building blocks of such unequal orders. In another
example, one commentator has argued that a key move necessary for
producing more mathematicians of color is to teach elementary school
teachers more math.66 It is necessary to zoom in analytically on such concrete
65 For a thorough example of such systemic analysis, see Richard Valencia, The
Plight of Chicano Students: An Overview of Schooling Conditions and Outcomes, in
CHICANO SCHOOL FAILURE AND SUCCESS: RESEARCH AND POLICY AGENDAS FOR
THE 1990S 3 (Richard Valencia ed., 1991).
66 See Patricia Clark Kenschaft, Racial Equity Requires Teaching Elementary School




ordinary acts and social interactions in education in order to prove how such
moments provide or deny specific educational opportunities to students of
color, or-in the case of interpersonal interactions between adults and young
people-to demonstrate how such moments are the building blocks of hostile
environments felt by children of color.
In the past, racial inequality was built through a triumvirate of explicitly
racist laws, indirectly racist policies, and ordinary explicit racist practices.
The underfunded segregated black school pre-Brown, for example, was a
result of laws enforcing segregated schools, school board practices of
funneling money away from black schools, and the individual white principal
standing at his schoolhouse door denying individual black children entry.
Today, the explicitly racist laws officially enforcing racially unequal
opportunity in so many words are gone; remaining are our ordinary behaviors
and policies that harm children as race group members, sometimes actively,
sometimes unintentionally, and often through passive acceptance of
inequitable opportunity. Indeed, at the turn of the twenty-first century, even
blatant racial disparities in resources and achievement between classrooms,
schools, and districts are often taken for granted as normal.6 7 Successful
arguments in the new civil rights era, thus, will need to show more rather
than just tell about racial inequality. Such arguments will need to examine
actual practices, policies, and processes in education that deny specific
opportunities, and explain how these practices, policies, and processes
disadvantage or harm children as young individuals of color, by denying
them specific opportunities to learn or specific social opportunities to thrive.
At the symposium that prompted this Article, Professor Roslyn
Mickelson provided such specific evidence of harm by demonstrating that in
Charlotte, North Carolina, racially harmful tracking takes shape in part
through an exceedingly ordinary act: the publication of inaccurate enrollment
requirements suggesting that a student must be tested as "gifted" before he or
she can enroll in Advanced Placement courses.68 Such false information,
neutral on its face, has a racially disparate impact on the district's black
students who--in another racially unfair ordinary practice-are less likely to
be tested as "gifted" in the first place. While such analysis demonstrates how
certain acts harm kids of color all at once, in other cases advocates need to
show precisely how individual kids of color are harmed as kids of color one
67 Kozol presents an excellent illustration of how many Americans now normalize
unequal opportunity in American schooling-either by not being too bothered by it (more
typically the stance of white Americans, who less often experience egregiously unequal
resource) or by not protesting it. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICA'S SCHooLS 7-39 (1991).
68 Roslyn Mickelson, Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte, Address at the Ohio State Law Journal Symposium: Meeting the Challenge of
Grutter: Affirmative Action in Twenty-Five Years (Feb. 24, 2005).
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at a time. As Theresa Perry's work shows, the narratives of successful black
public figures are filled with descriptions of such ordinary moments when
educational careers were temporarily stunted-or painfully spurred on-by
the ordinary disparaging statements and everyday treatment of teachers and
administrators toward individual young black people. 69 My own work
concentrates even further on the ordinary actions educators that take that help
or harm children in racial terms: things as ordinary as the words one puts in
the school mission statement or what one says or does not say about who is
wandering in the hallways.7°
Advocates for equal opportunity also need to be more skilled at
unpacking the constitutive practices that are building more systemic patterns
of harm. Often, advocates simply denounce harmful patterns. For example,
an analyst might simply denounce, to a group of district educators, the drastic
overrepresentation of black students in the district's special education
classroom. 7' However, it may be much more successful in the new civil
rights era to pinpoint a succession of (often unintentionally harmful) ordinary
moments that produced the pattern denounced. For example, one could
analyze retrospectively the literacy experiences of one black boy, Johnny,
who is not taught to read adequately within a class of children of color,
where his teacher is less trained and tutoring resources are less available than
in a neighboring classroom or school serving predominantly white children.
In doing so, one may find (as have many researchers studying the production
of "disability") 72 a spiral of consequential moments. For example, Johnny,
frustrated that he could not read, perhaps argued with his teacher and was
disciplined several times within a week for defiance. Perhaps he was then
evaluated for special education as someone with an emotional disability and
placed in special education, where still, no one adequately monitored his
reading experience. Arguments pinpointing the specific acts that produce
racially disparate outcomes in the aggregate or in individual lives like
Johnny's are not just necessary for navigating the resistance of critics. To fix
the racially aggregated outcome like the special education demographic,
educators actually will have to reorder ordinary acts toward individual black
69 See generally Theresa Perry, Freedom for Literacy and Literacy for Freedom: The
African-American Philosophy of Education, in YOUNG, GIFTED, AND BLACK, supra note
36, at 11.
70 POLLOCK, supra note 1.
71 Evidence of such disparities can be found generally in RACIAL INEQUITY IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION (Daniel Losen & Gary Orfield, eds. 2002).
72 See Hugh Mehan, Beneath the Skin and Between the Ears: A Case Study in the
Politics of Representation, in UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON ACTIVITY
AND CONTEXT 241, 244-68 (Jean Lave & Seth Chaiklin eds., 1996). See generally




children. Educators themselves will have to zoom in and examine their
processes of teaching specific black children to read, their processes of
referring black students to special education, and black students' literacy
experiences in special education.73 Such analysis is an example of what I am
calling the stance and practice of "everyday justice." Such analysis attempts
to investigate and show, rather than just tell, how kids of color might be
harmed or disadvantaged (and conversely, aided or assisted) by ordinary
educational treatment.
While one could simply call the end state of this special education
disparity "discriminatory," in the new civil rights era-where no policy
explicitly enforces this pattern-advocates need to prove the ordinary and
disadvantaging moves that made the pattern. Otherwise critics will argue
simply that the end state disparity is not "discriminatory" on its face and they
will thwart analysis of the disparity's production. Unfortunately, this very
argument has been made at OCR under the George W. Bush administration.
In 2001, George W. Bush temporarily appointed Gerald A. Reynolds as the
head of OCR via a congressional recess appointment. Mr. Reynolds had
previously openly argued that he did not believe in using the long legacy of
"disparate impact" analysis to open civil rights investigations based on end-
state statistics showing racially disproportionate student assignment or
outcomes. For example, Mr. Reynolds was not in favor of opening cases
triggered by statistics showing that suspiciously high proportions of a district
or school's black students were placed in special education or suspended. As
Losen described, after Reynolds's appointment, some top OCR officials
actually distributed internal memoranda to employees instructing them to
avoid investigating cases in which complainants primarily supplied OCR
with troublingly racialized or gendered statistics.74 I have accordingly urged
that complainants arrive at OCR equipped not only with end-point
comparative evidence of how harm to children has patterned out racially (the
racial special education demographics), but also with evidence identifying
some concrete practice, policy, or process that is causing the harm.75 Today's
advocates for racially equal opportunity will do best by getting equipped with
evidence of specific practices creating racial patterns and with an argument
about specifically how these practices are unfair to students of color.
Equal opportunity analysis today is like effective work against cavities:
we need sharp analytic tools, like plaque removers, to pinpoint and excavate
specific actions that undeservedly harm children of color. This brings us to
73 For a discussion of the last issue, see Twakia Martin, The Literacy Experiences of
Two Third-Grade Black Males in Inclusive Special Education Settings (qualifying paper,
Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2005) (on file with author).
74 Losen, supra note 57.
75 Pollock, Keeping on Keeping on, supra note 2.
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my second recommendation for successful argument for racially equal K-12
opportunity in the new civil rights era: I contend that advocates should avoid
insinuations about malicious educator intent entirely.
II. STRATEGY Two: ANALYZE HARM TO CHILDREN OF COLOR, NOT THE
INTENTIONS BEHIND IT.
The text of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
'7 6
Title VI's logic demonstrates the legalistic need to prove that
discrimination has occurred "on the ground of' or because of race. Yet when
Americans interact and make policies today, it is now often unclear to many
people in schools and districts whether specific actions are even racialized,
much less exclusionary to children or benefit-denying in purposeful racial
terms. Indeed, it is now often unclear to many Americans when race should
matter to how we interact, much less when race has mattered to ordinary
harmful and disadvantaging acts toward children." While lawyers feel that
they must seek intent as a disciplinary requirement,78 I contend that in
education, the real task is to avoid or remedy acts that are harmful to children
as children of color. Successful argument against racial harm in education, I
contend, may need to jettison the legalistic search for intent altogether, and
turn from analyzing racial intent to analyzing racial harm.
In the field of education, racism is already described too exclusively as
an interior, attitudinal phenomenon of bad intentions, just as it is in the law,
which presumes that "real" discrimination lurks within hearts and minds.79
Social science has the same problem: as formal Jim Crow laws fade into
memory and ordinary racial inequality remains, many social scientists
76 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 252
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)) (emphasis added).
77 Pollock, supra note 1; see also EVERYDAY ANTIRACISM, supra note 32; Mica
Pollock, Race Wrestling: Struggling Strategically with Race in Educational Practice and
Research, 111 AMER. J. EDU. 67 (2004) [hereinafter Race Wrestling].
78 See COMM. ON NAT'L STATISTICS, DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. ScI. AND EDUC.,
MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: PANEL ON METHODS FOR ASSESSING
DISCRIMINATION (Rebecca M. Blank, et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter MEASURING RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION]; CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW
AND PRACTICE (3d. ed. 2002); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L.R. 1161 (1995).
79 Krieger, supra note 78, at 1167.
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attempting to analyze such ordinary discrimination in contemporary
American life still often veer into a quest primarily for discriminatory
attitudes, framing contemporary discrimination as the "covert" presence of
discriminatory ideologies lurking "under" ordinary people's "colorblind"
talk.80 Even though such social science pinpoints important contemporary
behaviors, when analysis of racial harm to children seeks to probe
exclusively into educators' minds and hearts, educators always react
negatively to claims about harm to children. Far more socially successful, I
argue, are analyses of how and when specific, concrete, and ordinary
educator actions even unintentionally deny kids of color equal opportunities
to succeed.
In the OCR complaint process, for example, insinuations about intent
always ravaged educational communities and girded educators to resist
claims that students were even harmed at all, much less harmed because of
race. Complainants' arguments that past acts had been racially discriminatory
almost always insinuated, or even claimed directly, that these acts had been
intentionally harmful; complainants often spoke of educators' "racist"
attitudes. When processed through OCR's legal apparatus, these insinuations
about racist intent often became amplified even further. OCR lawyers seek
intent obliquely, asking whether recipients can justify their actions as based
on reasons other than race; yet even such indirect investigation of educators'
intentions always produced recipient rebuttals that their actions were not
intended to harm children, were not racially harmful to children, or were not
even "racial" at all. With evidence of harm "on the ground of race" presumed
legalistically to lie inside educators' heads, arguments over proof and
findings regarding racial discrimination always raised rebuttal claims of
insufficient evidence.
Legalistic arguments even obliquely demanding proof of intentions also
often increased local controversy over the reasons behind acts from the past,
rather than promoting educator-parent-advocate collaboration toward fair
treatment in the future. Indeed, in their resistance to all insinuations about
their bad intentions, educators wound up resisting making the very changes
that would keep parents of color from complaining again to OCR. While it
was clear that educators wanted better relations with complainants of color
80 For a discussion on the presence of discriminatory attitudes or logics "under"
"colorblind" statements, see Bonilla-Silva, supra note 55, at 476. See also generally
BONILLA-SILVA, supra note 20; Lawrence Bobo, Race, Public Opinion, and the
Social Sphere, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1997). I myself have written of colormuteness,
the self-conscious deletion of race labels from talk. See POLLOCK, supra note 1. In
my work with educators, however, I frame colormuteness as an action with often




(particularly parents), instead of fixing educational practices and
broadcasting that they would be equitable, all players simply debated OCR's
anticipated findings. As complainants and districts ended up arguing over
whether anyone intended to hurt children because of race, it often started to
seem that the point was not-as it should be-to improve the lives of
children, but rather to determine whether a district or school was full of good
or bad people. While complainants typically had approached OCR originally
asking for a more basic recognition that the acts in question had caused harm
to children (or themselves) as people of color, both complainants and
recipients often ended up disputing the intentions behind or under the adult
acts taken toward children, more than the empirical consequences of those
actions on children. The sense of seeking racism "under" the actions of
educators drove recipients to resist all allegations of "discrimination" with
insistences that "race" had nothing at all to do with their ordinary actions.
My research leads me to suggest that if advocates talk more about harms
that students experience as race group members and less about the intentions
of those adults harming them, many educators will be more apt to remedy
past harm and to analyze their own practice to prevent future harm. This
result is likely because most educators enter the field of education
determined to help children rather than to harm them.
This suggestion to steer away from intent analysis is echoed in much
current scholarship on the law. In critiquing legal habits of analysis, scholars
argue not only that analysis of discriminatory behavior must transcend
reductive notions of conscious intent,81 but also that lawyers must
comprehend the unintentional ordinariness of discrimination rather than
framing discrimination as the aberrational acts of intentionally harmful
people. Critical race theorists who have denounced the constrictions of civil
rights law have long argued that American law, in its intent framings, has
been unable to contend with the ordinariness of racial discrimination. As
some commentators have observed, the American legal order played a central
role in the very deradicalization of racial liberation movements by its very
framing of intentional harm as a rare thing, and one increasingly imagined as
a thing of the past:
82
Along with the suppression of explicit white racism (the widely celebrated
aim of civil rights reform), the dominant legal conception of racism as a
discrete and identifiable act of "prejudice based on skin color" placed
81 A cluster of social scientists and lawyers, Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Greenwald,
and Linda Krieger, were working on this argument at the Radcliffe Institute in 2004-
2005. See also Krieger, supra note 73. For related prior arguments in this vein, see
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
82 See CRrrcAL RACE THEORY, supra note 17.
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virtually the entire range of everyday social practices in America-social
practices developed and maintained throughout the period of formal
American apartheid-beyond the scope of critical examination or legal
remediation.
83
Further, legal ideas of discrimination, focused on pinpointing
"intention," have themselves aided the rhetorical rebuttal that in any
particular case, something called "discrimination" has not likely occurred
because it has not been intended:
The [law's] construction of "racism" from what Alan Freeman terms the
"perpetrator perspective" restrictively conceived racism as an intentional,
albeit irrational, deviation by a conscious wrongdoer from otherwise
neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power, prestige, and
wealth. The adoption of this perspective allowed a broad cultural
mainstream both explicitly to acknowledge the fact of racism and,
simultaneously, to insist on its irregular occurrence and limited
significance.
84
Many legal analysts fault the intent requirements of American law for
constricting the entire civil rights project in American life; they argue that
judges focused civil rights attention too narrowly on punishing only the most
explicit, aberrational, and purposefully cruel acts perpetrated against people
of color, rather than also dismantling as discriminatory the full range of
normalized unequal opportunities that people of color were suffering on an
ordinary basis8 5 They particularly lament the law's failure to reengineer
ordinary behaviors, pointing out that judges and courts over the decades
following the civil rights movement have become unwilling to call
discriminatory most of the ordinary activity that actually produces racial
inequality. 86 Scholars note that particularly since the 1980s, American civil
rights law (in education and other arenas) gradually relinquished the full
study of Americans' discriminatory behaviors for a fundamentally limited
analysis of Americans' discriminatory attitudes. American race law gradually
83 Id. at xv (emphasis added).
84 Id. at xiv.
85 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown Versus
Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 92-118
(June 2004); see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, supra note 17; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, in id. at 5-19; see also
Krieger, supra note 78.
86 For a useful overview of these critiques, see generally CRrrICAL RACE THEORY,
supra note 17.
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constricted analysis of racial discrimination to include as "discriminatory"
only the intentionally harmful actions of atypical, individual "racists."
"Racism was identified only with the outright formal exclusion of people of
color; it was simply assumed that the whole rest of the culture, and the de
facto segregation of schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, would remain
the same." 87 Accordingly, the law has failed at equipping Americans with the
tools to address how racism really works-through ordinary, systemic, and
often unintentional disadvantaging acts. Many social scientists attempting to
measure racial discrimination today, thus, urge explicitly that definitions of
discrimination must go beyond the restrictive definitions of American law.88
As Lawrence argues, notably of children:
Does the black child in a segregated school experience less stigma and
humiliation because the local school board did not consciously set out to
harm her? Are blacks less prisoners of the ghetto because the decision that
excludes them from an all-white neighborhood was made with property
values and not race in mind?
89
Those arguing for retaining the tool of "disparate impact analysis,"
Lawrence notes, argue that "the 'facts of racial inequality are the real
problem"'; they urge that racially disproportionate harm should trigger
heightened judicial scrutiny without consideration of motive.90
In the new civil rights era, then, looking primarily inside heads for
intentions or attitudes may be less effective analytically and socially than
demonstrating how and when specific, concrete, and ordinary actions deny
race group members equal opportunities to succeed. 91 The legalistic search
for discriminatory intent may be a particular dead-end in education, both
analytically (because intentions are often impossible to ascertain) and
socially (because the search for discriminatory intentions makes people
defensive rather than collaborative). At OCR, I found that quests to evaluate
87 Id.
88 A "Panel on Methods for Assessing Discrimination" convened by the Committee
on National Statistics in 2001 argued pointedly that, "we do not believe that a social
science research agenda for measuring discrimination should be limited by... legal
definitions." MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 78, at 41.
8 9 Lawrence, supra note 81, at 319-20.
9 0 Id. Advocates (such as the National Women's Law Center) for using disparate
impact analysis to analyze gender discrimination have made similar arguments. See,
e.g., Letter from Marcia D. Greenberger, Co-President of the National Women's
Law Center, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee (Mar. 4, 2002),
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/ReynoldsOppositionLetter.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
91 POLLOCK, EVERYDAY JUSTICE, supra note 2.
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harm because of race always consumed district and school employees'
energies in resisting the very claim of racial harm, deflecting the real
educational task of repairing harms felt by children. The more socially and
analytically fruitful task-and indeed, the educational task-was to begin to
analyze how children had been harmed as race group members, to remedy
whatever harm they had experienced, and to prevent such harm or feelings of
harm from happening again. Because if children and parents experienced
schooling as harmful in some way, then some move toward repair was the
only way forward to improved social and educational relations.
The everyday justice task in K-12 education is not just to reshape
educators' beliefs and internal biases regarding children, but to reorganize
behaviors to not be racially harmful to children. Far more profitable in the
new civil rights era, I contend, will be analysis that demonstrates with clear
evidence just how harm to children patterns out racially, how harm is
experienced by children and parents as racial, and how children from some
racialized groups are harmed in ways that children from other racialized
groups typically do not experience. From the advocate side, this again
requires evidence that identifies some concrete practice, policy, or process
that is causing the harm. From the lawyer side, it also requires accepting
evidence that children have been harmed as race group members by specific
actions, regardless of the perpetrators' conscious intention.92 This in turn
requires listening to what Freeman called the "victim perspective" simply to
understand the experience of harm1.9 3 In the world of K- 12 education, the real
educational problem is that harm is experienced by children and parents of
color, even if this harm might not be found to actually rise to the level of a
legal violation by intent-focused lawyers. OCR work demonstrated that in
educational settings, if children are to be protected, it is crucial to analyze
any racially harmful effects of ordinary behavior, in part by analyzing
environments in which kids and parents feel discouraged, disadvantaged,
disliked, or devalued as race group members.
Supporting claims that children experience harm as race group members,
however, also requires comparison to some treatment that is better. To be fair
to educators, not all claims of racial harm can be accepted as fact and used
immediately to make fundamental changes in school or district practices.
Complainants of color, unsurprisingly, found everyday interactions far more
damaging than white educators imagined them to be. But complainants of
color often offered concrete comparative evidence supporting their claims of
harm, rather than assuming that OCR would take their claims of harm at face
value. Indeed, they had to provide such evidence of harm to even have their
complaints accepted at OCR. OCR cases, filed by American parents,
92 Id.
93 See Freeman, supra note 85.
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guardians, and advocates, always requested important comparative analysis
of how school and district adults acted toward students of various race
groups on an ordinary basis-how they disciplined students, taught them,
placed them in programs, wrote policies regarding them, diagnosed them,
and talked to them and their families-and of the potentially harmful effects
for children of these acts. While they did complain informally about educator
"racism," complainants typically did not request explicitly that OCR uncover
whether discriminatory attitudes lurked covertly in the minds of educators or
administrators; rather, they requested comparative analysis of whether
educators' ordinary, normalized actions actually disadvantaged group
members in concrete ways that members of other groups did not experience.
And while in a contemporary court setting-as a colleague at OCR conveyed
to me-lawyers must basically "do a 'Perry Mason' on districts to get them
to confess that they hate all black kids," OCR's administrative laws and
regulations at least offer the comparative tool of seeking intent obliquely.
This is done by comparing the actual ordinary harms experienced by
members of different race groups and asking whether any different treatment
could be at all justified. OCR's work thus sometimes offers what critics of
the law have long been calling for: a basic view of discrimination today as
ordinary, comparatively harmful behavior.94
Once again though, legalistic comparison of race group experience was
essential, but also itself analytically flawed at times. OCR's legal tools
offered some crucial analyses of comparative harm and opportunity other
than just the dead-end search for intent, but processing claims of
discrimination through the OCR apparatus always required some self-
defeating forms of legalistic proof that were impossible to find. As OCR
analysis zoomed in to compare the treatment of children of different racial
groups in specific incidents, for example, analysis of isolated events one at a
time sometimes demonstrated that no one incident could be deemed
egregiously different treatment in legalistic terms. This was the case even
though, in the aggregate, students had clearly experienced treatment that they
found racially harmful. At other moments, the required comparison to the
better treatment of students of other race groups (particularly whites) was
simply not available given the demographics of the school district. In other
cases, missing evidence on the superior treatment of white students (typically
unrecorded in schools) could easily gut a legal claim of discrimination
against a student or students of color.
This is why, in the new civil rights era, those claiming racial harm might
need to both use and transcend current legal tools to analyze the experience
of harm felt by students and parents of color. While zooming in to analyze
isolated acts to compare race group members' experience of those acts is
94 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 17.
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essential, advocates for racially equal opportunity today must also examine
the treatment of children of color in comparison not just to the treatment of
white children, but also to the educational treatment considered standard,
adequate, and humane for any child. I suggest this tripartite comparison (to
the treatment of whites, to standard treatment, and to humane treatment) for
both analytic and rhetorical reasons. In the new civil rights era, advocates for
racially equal opportunity must make comparisons that successfully prove
unequal opportunity to skeptics with power over children's lives; advocates
must also make comparisons that inspire others to work toward opportunity
equalization.
HI. STRATEGY THREE: COMPARE CHILDREN OF COLOR'S SPECIFIC
OPPORTUNITIES TO STANDARD, ADEQUATE, AND HUMANE
OPPORTUNITIES, AS WELL AS TO THOSE EXPERIENCED BY WHITE
CHILDREN.
When analyzing discrimination complaints at OCR, I typically compared
the acts taken toward children of color both to standard practice in a school
or district, and to acts taken toward children of other racialized groups,
typically white children. As stated earlier, OCR's tools always required
certain kinds of evidence that was impossible to find (e.g., evidence of the
treatment of white students in isolated comparative incidents), either because
no data existed on white students experiencing comparable incidents,
because-as in many resegregated or never desegregated districts-no white
students existed at the school, or because no one kept records on standard
practices. It is rare for educators to keep records on white students being
treated well, not being given detention, or being offered standard
opportunities. Further, many public schools and districts in the new civil
rights era contain no white students at all. And in most cases, educators could
explain away poor treatment as not unfair or not comparatively bad.
While analysts sometimes importantly compare the opportunities of
various groups of color to one another,95 the comparison to whites
undergirding Brown and Title VI is still necessary. This is why many people
within OCR during my time there were attempting to push the agency to do
both intradistrict and interdistrict comparisons of resource distribution
between schools and districts of different demographics, and advocates for
desegregation continue to argue that desegregation plans should be
metropolitan in order to equalize resources and clout between cities and
95 See, e.g., POLLOCK, supra note 1, at ch. 4 (commenting on multiracial inequality
systems); Pollock, Race Wrestling, supra note 77 (commenting on the specific treatment
of black students within diverse all-of-color schools, for example).
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suburbs.96 Yet OCR's legalistic analysis often shoots itself in the foot by
enforcing a search for the very compared-to-white "proof' that is impossible
to find using OCR's current comparative tools.
Also difficult was our tactic of evaluating the comparative racial
harmfulness of isolated events. While zooming in on each small social move
to analyze and evaluate its comparative racial equitability was a core aspect
of determining the existence of discrimination (indeed, I am advocating for
such an analysis in my first suggestion97), when we zoomed in on any given
action toward a student or parent, it often became hard to evaluate the
isolated action's racial nature in comparison to other groups' experience. At
the zoomed-in level of focus, the comparisons to other-group experience
typically sought for evaluating different or unfair treatment of race-group
members were often no longer available; the question of harm in racial terms
often boiled down to one person's word against another's.
Yet still, OCR's Title VI analysis also caused all players to examine
harm comparatively; it pushed the analysis of the crucial question of how
ordinary actions might have hurt children along racial lines. The analysis also
provided the important tool of comparing the treatment of children to the
treatment presumed appropriate by common standards. For example, a
suspension could be judged harmful if it exceeded the consequences of the
school handbook and could not be explained away as deserved.
Most successful analytically was combining the law's habit of carefully
evaluating individually small acts for comparative racial fairness with
analysis of the aggregated harm complainants said they experienced when
these individual acts combined over time. To judge harm, it was necessary to
both zoom in on particular incidents to evaluate them comparatively and to
zoom out again to evaluate the social and educational climate experienced by
complainants and their children.
Still, in education in the new civil rights era, the most effective way to
analyze the harm that children experience as race group members could be to
compare the specific experiences of children of color not only to the specific
experiences of white children, but also to the specific opportunities deemed
essential by common standards (the linchpin of the adequacy movement).98
While I was at OCR, a special "Early Learning" project that colleagues
and I participated in attempted to institutionalize this dual comparative logic
at OCR. Considering the specific schooling opportunities denied to many K-
3 students of color in the United States (certified teachers, up-to-date
curricula, and facilities for learning science, for example), we reasoned that
students of color's opportunities to learn could be deemed unequal, both in
96 See, e.g., powell, supra note 18.
97 See supra Part I.
98 See SCHRAG, supra note 6.
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comparison to white children's and in comparison to the opportunities
deemed necessary by common standards. We reasoned that if states, districts,
and the federal government are increasingly articulating what students are
supposed to know and be able to do in the early grades, and if they are
penalizing or advancing students based on the high-stakes demonstration of
such knowledge and skills on tests, then these standards are a concrete
benchmark against which advocates can measure whether young students of
color actually receive equal opportunities to learn the fundamental skills,
content, and concepts for which they are being held accountable. This dual
comparative logic-comparing the opportunities given students of color both
to those given white children and to those opportunities conventionally
deemed adequate-is essential in the new civil rights era.
As I want to conclude, the new civil rights era may demand inspiring
fellow Americans with a "rights discourse" that compares opportunities
given to children of color to opportunities considered standard and even to
the treatment that any American would deem humane for his or her own
child. This "rights discourse" may best inspire educators, too, to collaborate
with parents and advocates in their own acts of everyday justice. My final
and related suggestion, then, is to inspire the contemporary discourse of
educational rights by framing educational opportunity not only as a
compared-to-white problem, but also as a basic civil right of an American
child-and a human right.
IV. FINAL STRATEGY: INSPIRE A "RIGHTS DISCOURSE" IN EDUCATION
Advocates tend to work toward equal opportunity in education by
demanding it, more often than by inspiring others to provide it. Those
making arguments for equal opportunity need to consider carefully when to
frame listeners as opponents who need to be pushed angrily to provide equal
opportunity, and when to frame listeners as colleagues who need to be
convinced and inspired to collaborate in providing it. Considering carefully
when conflict or collaboration will better assist children is particularly
important when interacting with K-12 educators. One superintendent told me
that being accused of discrimination is a shock to the system; the question for
education is when and how this shock to the system works to commit
educators to serving children equitably, and when it keeps people from
analyzing ordinary disadvantaging processes. As Gloria Ladson-Billings,
now President of the American Educational Research Association, said to me
when I interacted with her during the OCR's Early Learning project,
educators will perhaps only work toward racial equality when they want it;
when there are no rules. Back to the cavity analogy, then, advocates for equal
opportunity could need at times to treat K-12 educators using a sensitive
toothbrush: brushing gums until they bleed does not make them cleaner. This
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became particularly clear to me while working at OCR: even when OCR
succeeds in enforcing a written legalistic vision of equality through its
complaint resolutions or compliance reviews, ordinary educators remain in
charge of what happens to children on a daily basis.
Adversarial relations between educators and advocates must thus be used
strategically in the new civil rights era. A stance of collaboration between
educators, parents, and even equity-minded federal officials often succeeds
best in embedding a civil rights logic into everyday K- 12 life. At other times,
the legalistic enforcement stance is necessary for ordering the redistribution
of basic resources, or for simply stating loudly the fact that equal opportunity
is actually required. Law particularly can force the higher-up redistribution of
resources, and it must be used as such in the new civil rights era, as in recent
adequacy cases.99 But law cannot force people to analyze equal opportunity
locally and routinely, nor can it force or inspire educators to actually act
affirmatively in everyday ways to enable children to succeed.
Part of what is necessary, I believe, is to inspire a contemporary
educational effort toward equal opportunity by framing the ordinary educator
act of providing adequate educational opportunity K-12 as an American civil
rights project for American children'0° and, more broadly, as a human rights
project. Such a framing asserts that children of color deserve equal
opportunity because they are children. While I was at OCR circa 2000, a
multiracial coalition of advocacy groups outside the agency increasingly
raised the argument that equitable opportunities to learn should be
educational civil rights in the contemporary United States. Others even
transcend the logic of race-group assistance by arguing for education as a
fundamental constitutional right and even as a basic human right.'0 ' These
arguments may be catching hold. We never have framed education as a
human right for children in the United States (or even, constitutionally, a
fundamental one), even though our ambassadors often frame education that
way for children elsewhere in the world. While post-apartheid South African
children now march to school buoyed by human rights logic, in the United
States the idea that all children have the right to adequate learning
opportunities in their schools oddly seems to be a question for debate.
Today, however, advocates for equal opportunity are increasingly
framing students in the United States as having civil and human rights to
learn, as a purposeful strategy for convincing other Americans to provide
99 See id.
100 For a particularly successful attempt at framing the issue as such, see MosES,
supra note 48.
101 See id. Jeannie Oakes at UCLA, and Goodwin Liu at University of California,
Berkeley have also been collaborating on formulating such an argument.
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equitable opportunity.10 2 For we are realizing that if education is not framed
as a "right," then access to adequate, humane, and decent opportunities to
learn and thrive is framed as a result of chance and luck, not as a necessity.
Caring Americans often look at crumbling schools, overcrowded classrooms,
and students learning in basements as unfortunate; some of us even get
extremely angry. But we too rarely frame such circumstances as civil rights
violations or, even more broadly, as violations of children's human rights. As
Loewen suggests, a sense of a "right" to educational opportunity (or a "right"
to be free from racially organized harm in school) prompts a sense of
necessary repair for opportunities denied: "Once a right has been declared,
someone deprived of that right does not have to prove, through some kind of
social science reasoning, that the deprivation caused measurable injury."'0 3
In the end, I believe, a stance of education as a civil right or human right
of children is what will truly inspire the stance of "everyday justice" in
education that I contend is a necessary component of meeting the challenge
of Grutter. Meeting this challenge requires everyday acts of opportunity
equalization and provision from ordinary Americans, and everyday acts of
opportunity equalization and provision cannot be manufactured only by force
or law. I believe that people can be convinced to provide and equalize
opportunity for students of color if they are (1) convinced that (and how)
children of color are being harmed and denied opportunities to learn and
thrive undeservedly, even if unintentionally, through ordinary activity, and
(2) convinced that adequate educational opportunity is not just a civil right
for children of color, but a human one. While the question of promoting good
will from the other ordinary decision makers outside education whose acts
affect children of color is a question for another paper, 1°4 the possibility of
directing the will of educational decision makers toward providing everyday
justice seems less remote.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD EVERYDAY JUSTICE
Monitoring and revising ordinary acts in education so that acts always
provide-rather than deny-educational opportunity to children of color
constitutes what I call "everyday justice." Alongside calling for overtly
10 2 See generally LINDA DARLING HAMMOND, THE RIGHT TO LEARN: A
BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING SCHOOLS THAT WORK (1997).
103 jAMES W. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCmNCE IN THE CLASSROOM: STATISTICAL
TECHNQUES AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR WINNING CLAsS-ACTION Surrs 8 (1982).
104 For example, white middle-class parents deciding whether to leave cities when
their children reach school age are another key group of decision makers that affect all
children in a community; so are mayors, businesspeople, and state lawmakers.
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"big," "structural" policy moves,10 5 advocates trying to meet the challenge of
Grutter'06 also need to enact a grounded movement for racial equality in
educational opportunity through weighing each ordinary act affecting
students that is taken in classrooms, schools, and districts. I contend that such
a stance and practice of ensuring that children's (and particularly children of
color's) daily, normal opportunities to learn and succeed in school are
adequate and equitable is an essential, ongoing partner to the more
"structural" work of past and present civil rights social movements.10 7
To meet the challenge of Grutter, advocates for truly racially equal
opportunity in K-12 education must embed and enact the civil rights logic of
equal opportunity not just in national education policy, but also in the
everyday actions of the ordinary K-12 educator. Advocates can do so only by
working to convince while they demand.
105 An example of such high-level policy moves is to provide adequate funding,
resources, and teachers for students in each district and state.
106 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
107 On such movements past and present, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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